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Economic gains of liberalising access to fishing quotas within the 
European Union 
 
Jesper L. Andersen, Max Nielsen and Erik Lindebo1 
 
 
Abstract. This paper analyses the extent to which specialisation gains can be achieved by 
liberalising access to fishing quotas within the EU. Fishing quotas are today exchanged 
between EU member states at a rate of 4% of total turnover in EU fisheries. Germany, 
Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands are the most active. Only one-fourth of these 
exchanges are permanent. With the management systems in EU fisheries differing among 
countries, comparative advantages in fisheries exist in member states with the best 
management practices. Hence, although positive but small specialisation gains exist in EU 
fisheries today, these gains might potentially be increased by liberalising access to fishing 
quotas and allowing transferability of quotas between individuals from different countries on 
a permanent basis. Increasing the gains might, however, affect relative stability. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Countries endowed with fish stocks possess absolute advantages in fisheries. Countries with a 
greater ability to exploit fish stocks possess comparative advantages in fisheries. The utilisation of 
the comparative advantages in fisheries gives rise to economic gains through specialisation, 
assuming the presence of fisheries management to avoid overexploitation. Ownership of fish 
resources are national, implying that utilisation of comparative advantages across countries require 
continuous adaptation. Quota exchange between countries is a commonly applied instrument to 
adaptation.  
 The purpose of this paper is, by means of a case study of the European Union (EU), to identify 
the importance of country-wise quota exchange and to assess the extent to which gains from 
specialisation can be achieved through liberalising access to fishing quotas. For example, what is 
the level of adaptation through quota exchange? Have the comparative advantages in EU fisheries 
been utilised or can liberalisation of access to fishing quotas raise specialisation gains? This paper 
analyses quota data for 2004-2006 and official quota exchange data for 2000-2006 transmitted to 
the European Commission2. 
                                                 
1 Corresponding author Jesper Levring Andersen is senior adviser and Max Nielsen associate professor at the Institute 
of Food and Resource Economics, the Faculty of Life Sciences at the University of Copenhagen, Rolighedsvej 25, DK-
1958 Frederiksberg C, Denmark, e-mail: jla@foi.dk and max@foi.dk. Erik Lindebo is an economist at the European 
Commission, DG Fisheries and Maritime Affairs, e-mail: Erik.LINDEBO@ec.europa.eu. This work has been carried 
out with support from the OECD. The paper does neither reflect the views of the OECD nor the European Commission, 
only the personal views of the authors are presented.  
2 See www.fd.dk where this information and a range of other statistical information can be found and downloaded. 
TAC/quota data were also available for 2000-2003, but several unreliable figures were identified, and correcting was 
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 Owing to stock externalities in fisheries, management is necessary to obtain long-run economic 
gains. Biological management has to ensure sustainability, whereas economic management is 
necessary to promote the economic efficiency of fishing. With the introduction of the 200 nautical 
mile Extended Economic Zone, nations had the opportunity to claim the ownership of fish stocks 
within their zone in the late seventies and early eighties [1, Article 56]. However in the EU, member 
states' fish stocks are a common resource, and therefore it is the Council of Ministers of the EU 
which decides on the total allowable catches (TAC) and the quota allocation for each member state. 
It is within the competence of each state to decide how to allocate and manage this quota. Hence, 
biological management is decided by the Council, based on a Commission proposal, while 
economic management is a member state issue.  
 General limits for fishing capacity and effort are adopted by the Council, while the choice of the 
concrete management system is decided by each member state. Several different management 
systems are applied in different fisheries within the member states, ranging from regulated open 
access, via regulated-restricted access, to property right-based management like individual 
transferable quota schemes. However, with a recognised overcapacity of the EU fleet [2,3], 
changing the management approach can help to improve the economic gains in several EU 
fisheries.  
 Economic gains can be achieved by each member state through the introduction of property 
right-based management [4,5,6,7]. Several right-based management systems exist in EU fisheries in 
various forms, from pure individual transferable quota and license systems to systems where fishing 
rights are indirectly transferable and capitalised in the vessels themselves. 
 Achieving the full economic gains within the EU, however, further requires more liberal access 
to fishing quotas in order to utilise comparative advantages in fisheries. In general, a country with a 
higher productivity than another, for a given industry, possesses a comparative advantage. The 
difference in productivity might be caused by several factors, including differences in skills, capital 
and labour costs, including access to capital investment and availability of state aids and subsidies. 
In fisheries, however, management is a further important determinant of productivity. Within the 
EU, economic management of fisheries differs considerably between the member states [8]. 
Therefore, productivity differences exist and member states with a good track record of economic 
management might possess comparative advantages in fisheries. If these comparative advantages 
are to result in specialisation gains, the liberalisation of access to fishing quotas would be necessary. 
The consequence of liberalising access to fishing quotas is that the relative stability principle fixing 
the quota allocation between member states might be affected. Hence, a trade-off between 
achieving specialisation gains and keeping a fixed quota allocation exists.  
 The hypothesis is that quota exchange rarely occurs and affects relative stability only to a 
limited extent, thereby leaving unachieved economic gains from specialisation in EU fisheries. The 
main reason is overcapacity in EU fisheries, implying that most economically viable quotas remain 
fully used by the owner country and there are only few unused quotas to exchange away. 
Furthermore, member state governments are not expected to make cost-benefit analyses of how 
much value added one group of vessels has to give up in order for another to obtain a larger value 
added. National quota allocations between groups of vessels are not expected to change 
considerably by making country-level quota exchanges. Provided that the hypothesis holds there are 
unused economic gains from specialisation from the existence of an EU fisheries sector, beyond 
those resulting from more efficient national management. If it does not hold, these specialisation 
gains do not exist. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
considered too complex. The accession of new member states in 2004 reduced the number of quotas, especially in the 
Baltic Sea. Comparing the data for 2004-2006 with other sources, the available data is considered to be reliable. 
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 The paper is organised as follows. In section two, the quota allocation mechanism is described. 
In section three and four, respectively, the scale of quota adaptation and the influence on relative 
stability are assessed. In the last section potential specialisation gains are identified and the ways on 
how the gains can be achieved are discussed.  
 
 
2. Quota allocation 
 
The allocation of fishing rights between member states of the European Community was agreed 
following long negotiations on 25 January 1983 as a part of the Common Fisheries Policy [9]. This 
allocation is specified in the relative stability key still used today. The relative stability key had the 
political purpose to avoid lengthy discussion every year about allocation of the agreed Total 
Allowable Catches (TAC) and an industry purpose to give a reasonable security about catches and 
thus future planning [10]. The actual determination of the relative stability key was based on three 
elements. The first was historic catches based on a reference period from 1973-1978. The second 
was special provisions for fisheries dependent areas also known as the Hague preferences. Finally, 
jurisdictional losses following the implementation of the 200 nautical mile Extended Economic 
Zone by third countries were compensated. Complex calculations taking these three elements into 
consideration were afterwards performed in order to derive the “final” relative stability key. 
 Since 1983 there have been changes to the relative stability key, primarily following the 
accession of new member states. Following the revision of the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) in 
2002, the Council of Ministers decided to continue using the relative stability key despite it being 
argued that it was not in harmony with the principle of free movement of capital and labour within 
the European Union3. 
 Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation and 
sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the CFP [11] notes that: “In view of the 
precarious economic state of the fishing industry and the dependence of certain coastal 
communities on fishing, it is necessary to ensure relative stability of fishing activities by the 
allocation of fishing opportunities among the member States, based upon a predictable share of the 
stocks for each member State. In other respects, that stability, given the temporary biological 
situation of stocks, should safeguard the particular needs of regions where local populations are 
especially dependent on fisheries and related activities as decided by the Council in its Resolution 
of 3 November 1976(4), on certain external aspects of the creation of a 200-mile fishing zone in the 
Community with effect from 1 January 1977, and in particular Annex VII thereto. Therefore, it is in 
this sense that the notion of relative stability aimed at should be understood”. 
 In the same Regulation, Article 20 on the allocation of fishing opportunities further specifies 
that: “The Council, acting by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, shall decide 
on catch and/or fishing effort limits and on the allocation of fishing opportunities among member 
states as well as the conditions associated with those limits. Fishing opportunities shall be 
distributed among member states in such a way as to assure each member state's relative stability 
of fishing activities for each stock or fishery……member states may, after notifying the Commission, 
exchange all or part of the fishing opportunities allocated to them”. 
 The quota allocated to each member state via the relative stability key can initially be seen as 
rather restrictive for the utilisation of the comparative advantages. However, a member state has the 
possibility of changing this by making quota exchanges with another member state. It is noted, 
however, that quota exchange should not impact relative stability per se, as they are of temporary 
                                                 
3 EC Treaty, Article 39 Free movement of workers and Article 56 Free movement of capital [9]. 
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nature. Nevertheless, these exchanges are an indication of additional economic interests of member 
states’ fishing industries that are not fully met by initial quota allocations to member states. 
 The possibility of country-level quota exchange between member states was introduced with the 
CFP as early as 1983 [9]. Quotas can be exchanged on a temporary basis, but continuously repeated 
exchange is also possible. Therefore, quota exchange can be considered both as a short run flexible 
instrument, but also as a long run structural instrument.  
 Based on stock recommendations primarily from the International Council for the Exploration 
of the Sea, the European Community negotiates TACs for each species and management area 
regulated by using overall catch limitations. Following these agreements, the EU's part of the TAC 
is distributed to its member states by using the relative stability key. Besides EU member states, 
several other countries obtain a share of the TAC such as Norway, the Faroe Islands and Russia. For 
example, each year Norway and the European Community reach an agreement regarding the seven 
shared fish stocks in the North Sea, and undertake a series of exchanges of fishing possibilities in 
the North Sea and Northeast Atlantic. 
 
 The agreed TAC for 2004-2006 for the whole Northeast Atlantic area for all quota species is 
shown in Table 1 together with the share of the EU and member states4. 
 
TABLE 1. Initial TAC and country allocation, 2004-2006, 1,000 tonnes1. 
  2004 2005 2006 
TAC2 7,450 7,193 15,442
- EU 4,745 4,910 3,617
-   Belgium 30 31 31
-   Denmark 1,756 1,511 766
-   Estonia 62 92 86
-   Finland 81 105 124
-   France 338 371 324
-   Greece 0 0 0
-   The Netherlands 296 365 296
-   Ireland 207 234 198
-   Italy 5 5 5
-   Latvia 69 100 91
-   Lithuania 25 37 33
-   Poland 156 193 177
-   Portugal 87 131 107
-   Spain 311 437 307
-   United Kingdom 611 631 563
-   Sweden 211 259 253
-   Germany 259 268 235
-   Unallocated 240 137 21
Note:  
1. The salmon TAC is measured in pieces, and has thus been converted to weight assuming the average weight of 
a salmon to be five kilograms.  
2. The TAC more than double in 2006 mainly due to a substantial increase in blue whiting, which is a TAC only 
utilised to a limited extent.  
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Since quotas only exist in the Northeast Atlantic Ocean and not in the Mediterranean Sea, exchanges are only 
performed there.  
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An example of how the EU’s part of the eight cod TACs is allocated among member states is shown 
in Table 2.  
 
TABLE 2. Relative stability key for cod, percentage of EU share of the TAC. 
 BEL DNK DEU IRL ESP FIN FRA NLD PRT SWE GBR 
Barents Sea  19.26 49.79 8.10  10.51 12.34
Skagerrak 0.27 82.64 2.07  0.54  14.47
Kattegat  61.75 1.27    36.98
Baltic Sea  44.76 19.57 2.26    33.41
North Sea 3.56 20.45 12.97 4.40 11.56  0.13 46.93
W-Scotland, E-Greenland, Faroe 0.30 2.84 15.85 30.51   50.51
Irish Sea 1.36 65.82 3.64 0.36  28.82
Bay of Biscay, Iberian Seas 4.47 10.21 76.42 0.63  8.26
 
 
 
3. Quota adaptations 
 
Adaptations in quota occur between member states, which are not directly linked to individual 
fishermen. Instead quota adaptations are taken from or given to the overall member state quota 
level, which is then allocated to the individual fishermen accordance with the national regulation5. 
Three means of adaptation in the quota allocated to a member state can be identified: 
1) Transfers between years 
2) Revised recommendations during a year 
3) Exchanges within a year 
The EU legislation facilitates a flexible quota management system as specified in Council 
Regulation no. 847/96. If a member state has over- or underutilised some of its allocated quotas, 
this is generally deducted from or added to the quotas in the following year. However, the 
frequency of these transfers has not been possible to determine from the available data.  
New information may for different reasons become available during a year, leading to a 
reassessment of the biological advice. This may be based on new biological survey data or revised 
catch statistics. Uncertain stock conditions may also imply that quotas are set during the year. This 
has, for instance, been the case for the sand eel fishery since 2006, where the quota is determined in 
May based on the year-class abundance in the previous year. 
An individual member state can on its own initiative make adaptations within a year in its 
allocated quotas. Three types of adaptations can be identified: 
1) An exchange between member states 
2) An interchange within a member state 
3) A transfer within a member state 
Member states can exchange quotas between each other based on mutual agreements. These 
exchanges can cover different species and areas depending on the exact agreement. Since 2000 an 
interchange has only been utilised in 2001 and 2002, where Denmark converted 19,000 tonnes of 
sand eel in the Norwegian zone of the North Sea to Norway pout in the same area. Finally, a 
member state can be allowed to transfer quota from one area to another for the same species. A 
classic example of quota exchanges between member states is the Arcachon agreement. Since 1992, 
a bilateral agreement between France and Spain modifies the allocation of quotas between both 
                                                 
5 Arrangements initiated at the private level between fishermen located in different countries only concern the 
fishermen involved. Such arrangements are however not generally applied.  
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countries every year, increasing the French anchovy quota in exchange of increasing the Spanish 
hake quota6. 
The amount of quota involved in each of the three adaptation types is shown in Table 3. A 
steady increase in the exchanged amounts is observed during the seven years. Compared to the first 
years, a doubling is observed for 2005 and 2006. Although several reasons can have caused this, the 
most important and likely reason is that the quotas have become more restrictive in the national 
fisheries, and this has increased awareness about adaptation possibilities and the desire to utilise 
these in the member states.  
 
TABLE 3. Amount of member state quota adaptations 2000-2006, 1,000 tonnes. 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Exchange 197 229 198 200 290 422 395
Interchange   19 19      
Transfer 7 7 5 3 12 98 3
Total 204 255 222 203 302 519 397
 
 
The majority of quota adaptations are made by means of exchanges between member states, and 
hence this is the focus of the present analysis. There can be several reasons for such exchanges. 
Generally, the involved countries must be expected to obtain a benefit from making an exchange. 
The quotas are more or less determined individually. Therefore, it is often the case that member 
states run into a situation where some quotas are constraining, while others are not. If some of the 
constrained species are caught together with unconstrained species, this results in the fishery being 
closed. In order to continue the fishery, the member state can therefore try to find countries with 
excess amounts of the constrained species, and negotiate an exchange. Member states may also 
exchange for more altruistic purposes by giving unused quota away without obtaining anything in 
return.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Arcachon Agreement signed in 1992 between France and Spain, under which Spain commits to exchange 6,000 tonnes 
of anchovy in return of quota for other species i.e. hake, cod, monkfish and sole. These 6,000 tonnes were increased to 
9,000 tonnes later on. The agreement was renewed in 2003. 
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The following tables give an overview of involvement of EU countries in exchanges7. Table 4 
shows the provided quota amounts for each country, while Table 5 describes received amounts.  
 
TABLE 4. Country distributions of exchanges, provider countries, 1,000 tonnes.  
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Germany  60 66 36 40 85 97 87 471
Spain  50 43 46 47 54 58 69 365
Denmark  23 26 31 18 28 49 69 244
United Kingdom  7 16 9 18 31 51 31 162
The Netherlands 4 13 13 18 21 33 40 142
France  15 20 14 10 15 24 24 121
Sweden  5 10 11 9 7 35 24 101
Belgium  13 13 18 17 12 13 15 101
Portugal  10 10 11 10 6 15 7 69
Ireland  8 6 5 7 10 15 10 62
Lithuania       13 8 10 31
Finland  2 7 3 7 7 5 0 30
Poland       2 9 6 17
Estonia        11 1 12
Greece  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Latvia        1 1 2
Total 197 229 198 200 290 422 395 1,931
 
 
TABLE 5. Country distributions of exchanges, recipient countries, 1,000 tonnes. 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Germany  27 31 40 53 85 101 104 441
The Netherlands 17 30 26 46 70 100 88 376
France  48 46 39 26 28 34 25 247
Denmark  59 53 27 14 18 34 23 228
Sweden  12 25 16 10 8 29 32 132
United Kingdom  4 7 6 9 24 39 43 131
Spain  14 14 13 21 19 25 13 119
Ireland  3 4 7 4 14 20 19 72
Belgium  9 9 11 8 4 4 7 51
Finland    9 10 6 5 9 0 39
Portugal  2 2 2 5 6 6 3 27
Lithuania       6 4 17 27
Poland       2 7 13 22
Estonia        7 5 13
Latvia        2 2 4
Greece  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Total 197 229 198 200 290 422 395 1,931
  
The amounts traded are of course highly influenced by the type of species involved. Measured in 
weight, the TACs for low value species (typically fish used for reduction) are generally much 
higher than the TACs for species used for human consumption. Therefore it is not surprising that 
fish for reduction are among the most exchanged species based on weight, cf. Table 6.  
                                                 
7 Throughout the paper all EU member states at any given time are included. That is for 2000-2003 exchanges of 15 
member states are included and for 2004-2006 exchanges of 25 member states are included.  
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TABLE 6. Top 15 exchanged species measured in weight, 1,000 tonnes.  
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Herring 45 65 41 32 70 126 71 451
Jack/horse mackerel 41 35 35 47 48 76 66 347
Blue whiting 8 24 30 33 55 66 130 346
Sprat 31 19 18 14 27 36 9 154
Mackerel 16 13 15 18 14 13 14 100
Atlantic red fish 1 3 3 14 26 20 19 87
European anchovy 15 13 12 12 9 11 1 73
Cod 7 7 8 3 8 17 14 63
Sand eel   12 7   7 23 49
Plaice 6 9 7 3 3 5 7 41
Hake 11 4 4 3 4 8 6 39
Haddock 1 5 1 2 5 7 6 28
Anglerfish 4 5 5 3 3 5 3 26
Saithe 1 2 1 2 2 6 8 22
Whiting 4 5 3 2 1 0 2 17
 
 
If we convert the conducted exchanges into value using average yearly prices8, the picture changes 
significantly, cf. Table 7. As expected the species used for human consumption increase their 
relative importance. In total, the catch value of all exchanges from 2000 to 2006 is estimated to be € 
1.8 billion, if they are fully utilised. This gives a yearly average of € 251 million with an increasing 
tendency over the years. 
 
TABLE 7. Top 15 exchanged species measured in value, € 1,000.  
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Atlantic red fish 2 4 5 32 25 82 27 176
European anchovy 26 20 24 35 26 40 2 173
Hake 49 19 18 13 17 33 24 172
Cod 15 15 17 6 16 37 32 138
Anglerfish 21 26 26 13 13 21 15 135
Jack/horse mackerel 9 11 17 19 32 27 15 130
Sole 9 14 8 7 14 23 27 103
Herring 7 18 9 5 11 22 13 86
Northern prawn 7 5 6 6 20 19 13 76
Plaice 10 16 12 6 6 10 15 75
Norway lobster 6 8 14 8 9 13 9 67
Greenland halibut 6 6 8 23 7 1 14 64
Blue whiting 2 7 11 7 13 12 5 56
Mackerel 5 6 8 9 9 8 11 56
Megrims 2 8 9 10 6 8 1 44
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The prices are based on data from the New Cronos database covering seven of the main fishing countries within the 
EU, i.e. Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, Denmark, France, Sweden and the Netherlands. Further information about 
this can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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In Table 8 net quota exchanges measured in value are shown for each member state. It is 
observed that only two countries, Germany and France, lose catch value from quota exchanges. The 
remaining fourteen countries have all observed an increase in their catch value. 
  
TABLE 8. Net quota exchanges at member state level measured in value, € Million. 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Belgium  0 4 0 0 1 0 1 8
Germany  -8 -15 -7 -45 -21 -51 -18 -165
Denmark  11 9 -2 -1 7 11 3 39
Spain  19 14 3 18 -10 27 15 87
Estonia          1 0 1
Finland  0 1 1 0 0 1 0 2
France  -24 -14 -1 6 -8 3 -12 -49
United Kingdom  2 -4 0 7 4 -4 2 7
Greece  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ireland  4 1 5 1 2 2 0 15
Lithuania         3 -1 0 3
Latvia          1 0 2
The Netherlands -3 3 2 5 13 5 -3 22
Poland         2 1 6 8
Portugal  3 0 -1 6 5 4 4 21
Sweden  -4 1 1 2 0 -1 1 0
 
 
 
4. Influence of adaptations on the relative stability key 
 
The turnover of the whole EU fishing fleet from all fishing areas was € 6.4 billion in 2004 [13]. The 
annual average of exchanges made for quotas in the Northeast Atlantic Ocean was € 251 million 
over 2000-2006, which thus comprised some 4% of the total turnover, according to Table 9. Taking 
into account that a part of the total turnover originates from outside the Northeast Atlantic Ocean, 
exchanges formed more than the 4%9. Germany and Belgium are heavily engaged in quota 
exchanges, both as providers and recipients. The importance of quota exchanges for Denmark and 
the Netherlands are also above the EU average. Several other member states are engaged in 
exchanges around the average rate of 4%.  
 The difference between providing and receiving measures the net-effect of exchanges on 
relative stability. The potential German turnover falls by 12% compared to what could have been 
achieved provided that Germany had used the quotas themselves. The Lithuanian, Polish and Dutch 
turnover are positively affected, increasing by 6%, 4% and 3% respectively. Turnover of all other 
member states are affected by 2% or less. Hence, except for Germany quota exchanges have a 
limited effect on relative stability.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Assuming that Italian and Greek turnover originates from the Mediterranean Sea, that half the Spanish turnover 
originates outside the Northeast Atlantic Ocean and that a quarter of Portuguese and French turnover originates outside 
that area, exchanges accounted for 7% of turnover obtained from activities in the Northeast Atlantic Ocean.  
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TABLE 9. Quota exchanges at member state level as percentage of turnover, 2004. 
Exchanges (% of turnover) 
 
Turnover (€ Million) 
 Provider Recipient Difference 
Germany   176 34 22 -12 
Belgium   86 15 16 1 
Lithuania   52 6 12 6 
Denmark   352 7 9 2 
The Netherlands 380 5 8 3 
Poland   40 4 8 4 
France   754 6 5 -1 
Finland   21 5 4 -1 
United Kingdom   740 4 4 0 
Ireland   194 3 5 2 
Spain   1,500 3 3 0 
Portugal   347 1 2 1 
Sweden   91 1 2 1 
Greece  291 0 0 0 
Estonia   9 0 0 0 
Latvia   19 0 0 0 
Italy  1,380 0 0 0 
Total 6,432 4 4 0 
Source: Turnover figures originate from [13] 
 
 
 The importance of quota exchanges differs among species, however, as shown in Table 10. 
Measured as a percentage of total EU catches in the Northeast Atlantic Ocean, redfish, anchovy, 
horse mackerel and blue whiting are exchanged to the largest extent. Reasons include that the 
quotas of these species might not be fully utilised. Furthermore, it appears that herring and demersal 
species like cod, hake, anglerfish, haddock and plaice are also exchanged to some extent. Hence, 
larger vessels dependent on industrial species, such as herring and mackerel, are particularly reliant 
on the exchanges, although vessels generally dependent on demersal fish also have an interest in 
exchanges.  
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TABLE 10. Quota exchange as percentage of total EU catch for the Top 15 exchanged species. 
 
Catch 2004  
(1,000 tonnes) 
Exchanged (%)
Atlantic red fish 27 46
European anchovy 29 36
Jack/horse mackerel 222 22
Blue whiting 375 13
Hake 40 14
Anglerfish 29 13
Herring 737 9
Haddock 63 6
Whiting 29 8
Plaice 78 8
Cod 151 6
Saithe 51 6
Sprat 608 4
Mackerel 390 4
Sand eel 338 2
Note:   Annual average of exchanged quotas 2000-06 in percentage of total EU-25 catches in tonnes in the 
 Northeast Atlantic Ocean 2004.  
Source:  Eurostat New Cronos Database. 
 
 
 This can be compared to the annual transfer of quotas in the national individual transferable 
quota systems in Iceland, which on average traded 38% of the total quota in 2006-2007. For the 
three main species of cod, shrimps and redfish, quota trade was 26%, 30% and 35% respectively 
[14]. 
 
Quotas can only be exchanged on a temporary basis for one year. However, repeated quota 
exchanges can be made, implying that the exchanges obtain a more permanent character. To 
identify exchanges of almost permanent character, the share of exchanges made repeatedly in the 
same species in the same area, and between the same provider and recipient countries, are 
identified. The share of repeated exchange is identified in Table 11. Exchanges made in the 
beginning of the year where quotas are not yet constraining reveal more permanent character than if 
done later in the years where quotas become constraining.  
 
TABLE 11. Quota exchanges, allocated to time of year and number of years done.  
First Quarter Whole year 
 1,000 tonnes Percentage 1,000 tonnes Percentage
7  178 20 382 20
6 147 17 117 6
5 24 3 311 16
4 71 8 259 13
3 182 21 267 14
2 114 13 327 17
1 159 18 267 14
Total 877 100 1,931 100
 
 
It appears that 877,000 tonnes of the total exchanges of 1,931,000 tonnes were exchanges in the 
first quarter of the year. Of these exchanges, 20% were repeated in all the seven years and 17% 
repeated in six of the years. These exchanges have permanent character. Of the exchanges made 
 
 
11
over the whole year, 20% were made in all seven years and a further 6% in six of the seven years. 
These exchanges have almost permanent character. Hence, around one-fourth of the exchanges have 
permanent or almost permanent character.  
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions  
 
With national fisheries management systems differing considerably between EU member states in 
allowing continuous minimisation of costs through transferability [12], some member states possess 
comparative advantages in fisheries. Given the level of quota exchanges of 4% of total turnover, 
these comparative advantages are used to obtain gains from specialisation, since member states are 
presumed to participate in exchanges only if they obtain a gain from doing so. Compared to the 
Icelandic situation, this 4% is low. Hence, positive but low specialisation gains are revealed.  
 There are several reasons for the low specialisation gains. One is that member states need to 
exchange quotas away. In a situation with overcapacity where member states use several of their 
quotas fully, they might not have anything to exchange away. A second reason is that exchanges are 
of relative low importance for the single fishermen if country-level quota exchanges are allocated 
equally among fishermen. A third reason might be the lack of knowledge of the exchange 
opportunity among fishermen. 
 Given the low level, further specialisation gains can still be achieved with exchanges between 
governments on a temporary basis, where it is necessary to provide unused quotas in order to 
receive extra quotas. However, as we have seen, it is not possible for the single fishermen to 
optimise activities by purchasing quotas permanently from foreign fishermen. Furthermore, in a 
situation where there is overcapacity, member states might not have quotas to exchange away 
implying that the present quota exchange instrument might not work efficiently. Therefore, 
unachieved specialisation gains exist in EU fisheries.  
 The maximum specialisation gains can be achieved with full liberalisation of access to fishing 
quotas within all EU member states. This could also allow exchanges directly between individual 
fishermen from different member states in the form of transfers of quotas in exchange for money. 
Thereby, instead of claiming that one quota shall be exchanged for another, and that quota 
adaptations need to form part of the general management system, fishermen can organise their 
fishing activity and utilise their individual comparative advantages across borders. Allowing 
individual transfers would also do away with complicated and time-consuming quota exchanges 
between member state authorities. Furthermore, achieving the maximum specialisation gain also 
require that permanent transfers are allowed. Thereby, it will be possible for the individual 
fishermen to plan long-term investments after a quota purchase, instead of planning only one year 
ahead.  
 Specialisation gains can also be achieved at a more limited scale, either by allowing only some 
of the above mechanism or by allowing them only for certain fleet segments, areas or member 
states. Elements of such a policy already appear in the EU. In Denmark, individual quota exchanges 
in herring were allowed in 2006, giving the individual fishermen the opportunity of exchanging 
quotas with other member states. In 2007, individual quota exchange of mackerel and industrial 
species across borders were also allowed. Furthermore, elements of such a policy is applied in the 
recently renewed agreement on EU fishing in Greenland waters, which allow unused quotas of 
different member states to be transferred to other EU fishermen [15]. Elements of a policy 
promoting specialisation gains gradually could also be constructed by allowing individual cross-
national permanent quota transfers within a specified fleet segment or area. For example, one could 
start by allowing such transfers among large vessels operating over long distances, since they gain 
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from simultaneous access to waters in several member states. Another option is to allow individual 
cross-national permanent quota transfers within a specified area. For example, the northern hake 
fishery in the Northeast Atlantic or fisheries governed by regional fisheries organisations could 
provide an opportunity for fishermen in a well defined area to set up a tradable quota system. 
Implementing these options could increase gains from specialisation, but might in effect also touch 
on the basic principle of relative stability.  
 Allowing individual cross-national permanent quota transfers might further imply that member 
states indirectly obtain an incentive to improve policies aiming at improving economic efficiency. 
For example, by allowing transferability, fishermen from member states with such policies 
implemented might be able to purchase quotas from fishermen from member states without such 
management. The reason is that fishermen from member states with good management practices 
possess comparative advantage in fisheries and can therefore probably outcompete fishermen with 
less well-functioning management systems.  
 Setting up a market within the EU, where individual fishermen can exchange quotas, will need 
to consider several key aspects in order to obtain a well-functioning market that is capable of 
extracting the highest economic gains. In addition to the initial allocation of quotas to the individual 
vessels, transaction costs, non-profit maximising behaviour and market failures like concentration, 
illegal behaviour and imperfect information, it is also necessary to look at the administrative design 
of the market. The administrative design includes considerations regarding market structure, 
participants, information and instruments. 
 The structure of the market can either be in form of centralised market, where all exchanges 
have to be made through one single exchange authority, or a decentralised market, where 
individuals themselves find who to exchange with. Defining who can buy and sell quotas is 
important to consider. Besides the fishermen, it has in some situations been discussed whether other 
people should be allowed to participate in the market. However, allowing organisations and citizens 
to participate can potentially impede the achieving of an economically efficient situation [16], 
although brokers may help to ‘lubricate’ the market [17]. It is also important that potential buyers 
and sellers have perfect information on price and availability of quotas. As within financial markets, 
several different types of instruments can be allowed in order to increase flexibility and reduce risk. 
Examples of such instruments could be futures, insurance pools and leasing and banking 
possibilities [18]. 
 Thus besides initiating a quota exchange market, there are a range of other issues that need 
further consideration in order to obtain the highest economic efficiency. 
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